Petersberg Climate Dialogue – Personal Takeaways

24. 04. 2026

AUTHOR: Anne-Sophie Cerisola

The Petersberg Climate Dialogue (PCD), which was first convened by then German environment minister Angela Merkel 26 years ago, is traditionally the first ministerial-level meeting after the Conference of the Parties of the UN Climate Change Convention. It is believed that after a few months of reflection on the past year, ministers are ready to look forward and engage with the upcoming COP presidencies, always invited to preside over this meeting along with Germany. Even after a momentous, to say the least, international first semester, this year was no different and Australia and Türkiye, together with Germany, presided over two days of plenaries and break-out groups on shared reflections and priorities for COP31. Even though this small but representative group of countries offered only a sample of where countries stand, a couple of initial trends emerged during the discussions:

1) Climate multilateralism must deliver concrete results

• Starting with the upcoming presidencies, a clear call for the next COP to be ‘solutions-oriented’ and in ‘implementation mode’. Many countries mentioned their intention to use the action agenda space, restructured by Brazil into six sectoral axes, to fill gaps and deliver on the outcomes of the Global Stocktake (GST) agreed at COP28 in Dubai. Türkiye, presumably with the support of the UNFCCC secretariat, should ensure that at COP31 the outcomes of the action agenda are presented in an organised fashion, with a strong emphasis on: 1) initiatives and coalitions with a high degree of credibility transparency and accountability; 2) incentives to attract a diverse crowd of public and private decision makers, from finance to industry or cities, and civil society participants, in this ‘big tent’; 3) active communication and engagement with governments to explain the centrality of the the action agenda.
  • • • Issue to watch: It is hoped that Türkiye will work to streamline its own nine priorities within the existing framework, which should be doable, to preserve the clarity of the current action agenda. Countries do need easy access to this menu of solutions provided for each of the big sectors of the economy: to get help or ideas from a broad community in support of their national climate and development policies.
• There is more specificity on what an ‘implementation COP’ actually means. In the clean energy ‘axis’, it could mean countries and partners showcasing at COP31 how they support individual country platforms set up to design and implement national energy transition plans à la Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs); it could mean countries presenting their national roadmaps to transition away from fossil fuels as discussed in different ad hoc settings. More in line with COP practice, it should also mean, crucially, delivering on the upcoming replenishment of the Green Climate Fund and the operationalisation of key elements of the Baku to Belém finance roadmap.
  • • • Issue to watch: given the signals coming from the Spring meetings, World Bank’s Climate Change Action Plan renewal, due in June (US made clear that the plan and, more generally, the Bank’s support for national climate mitigation and energy transition is in jeopardy), it will be necessary to better activate national and regional development banks and additional financiers: private finance needs to be re-engaged and some useful proposals were made last year in the Report of the Finance Ministers Circle.
• Given diverse national circumstances, it makes sense to encourage coalitions of countries, supported by various stakeholders, to move faster to implement their commitments. That said, let’s be careful with the way we brand these coalitions, especially in these extremely challenging times: sometimes it is not about not being one of the ‘willing’ or ‘front runners’ or ‘doers’, just to use some of the most recent terms used to describe coalitions of countries. Often, it is also due to a lack of capacity and/or finance that countries cannot engage in a faster implementation track. It is worth recalling, once again, that many developing countries, especially in Africa, struggle to mobilise capital for energy infrastructure: Africa accounts for only 2% of clean energy investment despite accounting for 20% of the global population.
  • • • Issue to watch: There is a growing discussion around the idea of a two-tier or two-track multilateralism, separating the consensus-based negotiation space from the coalitions-based implementation space. Let’s be clear, though: implementation of COP commitments is not optional. As much as some countries do need more time and help, there are some laggards unwilling or too slow to implement their commitments (from energy to finance), and they should be called out.
• Australia, as negotiations lead, will need to ensure that governments abide by their Paris Agreement commitments. This means finalising negotiations on key processes: the Global Implementation Accelerator, also probably destined to play a key role in the ordering of the climate action space (Brazil will present a framework at the Copenhagen ministerial to this effect) and the Just Transition Mechanism. And Australia, together with Türkiye, will have to make sure that missing NDCs and Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) are submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat without further delay.
• It should be noted, finally, that this strong emphasis on the action agenda inevitably creates a tension between those who believe that the UNFCCC is first and foremost a ‘norm-creating space’ and those who think that in the midst of current dislocations, COPs need to be a global trust-building and results-based space. Both are needed, of course, and it is interesting that it is precisely in this moment of « tension » that governments decided to delegate the organisation of these two functions to a twin Türkiye – Australia COP presidencies. Let’s actively work with them to ensure it is a blessing – by demonstrating how negotiations and action agenda reinforced each other as planned in Paris – and not a curse.

2) The centrality of electrification and the ‘inevitability’ of the clean energy transition

• These points were forcefully made by a number of participants and by the IEA and IRENA chiefs, who both came armed with data and proof points. The current geopolitical havoc is here to stay, and we are now in the middle of the third shock on supply chains in 6 years (Covid, Ukraine and Iran) with enormous impacts on the predictability of global supply chains.
• That said, electrification and access to renewable energy (RE) are not a given for everyone: access to energy remains an issue, and both chiefs showed us worrisome numbers and maps on a new division: even though 2025 marked the largest increase in RE capacity and growth and the global share of clean electricity raising to 43% in 2025, significant disparities exist among and within countries and continents. For one, Ethiopia is on track to achieve universal electricity access by 2030 (thanks to a government-led and World Bank-funded rapid, large-scale transformation driven by the country’s unique hydropower capacities).
  • • • Issue to watch: electrification is too often presented as a kind of ‘silver bullet’, both in the short and the longer term, without much specificity on delivery and funding, and without recognising the national circumstances that will make it extremely difficult for countries heavily dependent on fossil fuels to accelerate this transition. The EU itself is still struggling with these issues (cf. current debates on taxation of energy; pooling of investments). It is now absolutely necessary to work on the concrete ‘offers’ (as opposed to the advocacy or the need for a new global target to be agreed this year) that can be made, for example, by the key industries of electrification and, more crucially, how to pay for it. If there is a space where advocacy and actions are needed, it is there.