10. 02. 2026
AUTHOR: Marin Gillot
The European Union (EU) faces a structural energy security challenge driven by its high dependence on imported energy, and gas is where that dependence is most acute. Yet a credible pathway out is now within reach. Large-scale electrification can cut EU gas imports to a residual level by 2040, leaving the Union reliant on just two reliable suppliers: Norway and the United Kingdom (UK). In doing so, the EU could shift from a gas system increasingly shaped by liquefied natural gas (LNG) cargoes from the United States (U.S.) to one anchored in demand reduction and its immediate neighbourhood.
Today, the EU remains one of the most energy-dependent economies in the world, with 58% of its energy imported in 2023. Its industry, heating, and power systems still rely heavily on foreign oil, gas and coal. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the adoption of the REPowerEU plan reshuffled Europe’s gas trade patterns, they did not end dependence. Instead, the EU turned to LNG, shifting supplier concentration from Russia to the U.S. From 6% of EU gas imports in 2021, U.S. LNG now accounts for 27%, a share that could reach 40% by 2030. By absorbing a majority of U.S. LNG exports, the EU subjects its economy to global LNG pricing and supply volatility. As such, it continues to buy its energy security abroad, risking the prolongation of an expensive and unpredictable dependency.
The electrification pathway reduces dependence
Electrification is the EU’s only credible exit from fossil fuel dependence at scale. Over the past decade, the Union’s electrification rate has stagnated at around 23% of final energy consumption, leaving vast potential untapped. By 2040, our analysis shows that the EU could electrify roughly half of its economy, cutting fossil fuel dependence by two thirds and delivering net savings of €29 billion per year through lower fuel imports and system costs. This is not simply a security imperative; it is also a core industrial strategy. Electrotechnologies are mature and scalable, with wind power, electric vehicles, and industrial heat pumps already anchoring new supply chains from Northern France and Italy to Bulgaria and Poland. Crucially, the scale of clean energy rollout envisaged is within reach: meeting electrification needs would require deploying around 80 GW of renewables per year through 2040, close to the more than 70 GW already installed in 2025. In the process, electrification will redirect a growing share of the European energy bill away from volatile imports and toward investment in jobs, prosperity, more stable power prices, and industrial competitiveness.
Building on this trajectory, the EU has a concrete pathway to sharply reduce its external gas import dependence before 2040. As gas demand falls to around 30% of today’s level, the Union can progressively unwind its most fragile supply relationships without creating a new lock-in. This includes ending Russian fossil fuel imports, allowing long-term LNG contracts to expire, and phasing out pipeline gas from Algeria, Azerbaijan, and Libya. By 2040, residual gas needs could be met through the EU’s most reliable regional sources:
- Norway (53%) – remaining the anchor supplier, even with declining output, as the EU secures a larger share of exports.
- EU domestic production (35%) – rebounding in the late 2020s (notably Romania), then gradually declining.
- the UK (12%) – remaining a steady supplier through interconnector and hub dynamics.
In this light, the upcoming 2026 Energy Security Framework offers a strategic opportunity to lock in this trajectory and avoid swapping one vulnerability for another.
From security of supply to security of investment
At this stage, the core risk to EU energy security is no longer gas availability, but misaligned investment. Gas demand can fall sharply ahead of 2040, yet market incentives still favour long-term LNG contracting and additional import capacity. This creates a structural mismatch in which supply commitments increasingly exceed economic need, turning security spending into a cost liability for the Union. Electrification is decisive because it determines whether demand declines fast enough to avoid this lock-in. If electrification accelerates, LNG contracts can expire without replacement and the residual gas system can be deliberately organised around the most reliable regional corridors with Norway and the UK as key partners.
The strategic choice is therefore straightforward: either align demand reduction, capital allocation and partnerships through electrification, or allow legacy gas investments to dictate Europe’s energy exposure well into the 2030s.
